The Case for Supervision – Part I

Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Lord Acton

The Problem

Early in my first career (24 years in the US Army) I occasionally heard of a senior officer being removed from command due to misconduct of some sort. Although relatively rare in an organization of hundreds of thousands, these incidents seemed to occur more often in situations where the leader was isolated from the next higher level of command, removed from the “prying eyes” of direct observation and supervision. Leaders selected for higher command on the basis of excellent performance are rightfully given increasing levels of authority along with a corresponding decrease in scrutiny that in retrospect increases the risk of abuse of that authority and a fall from grace. Career success necessarily brings both power and freedom. In turn, that same power and freedom increase the opportunity to stray from the straight and narrow conduct that earned success in the first place. Over time, I adopted a rule of thumb that adds to the observation of Lord Acton quoted above: “Everyone deserves to be supervised.”

Entering my second career field of education, I wondered whether the same rule would apply. It wasn’t long before I began learning of similar self– inflicted wounds that otherwise smart and competent superintendents created. Having risen to positions of power on the basis of ever-increasing career success, superintendents wield greater authority and autonomy to match their increased responsibility. As in the military, this makes sense in that it empowers leaders to get things done. But the trappings of high office carry with them the temptation to cut corners and ignore norms of conduct applicable to their many subordinates, norms that help keep the rest of us in line. Again, this phenomenon (the seductive combination of power and the absence of supervision) does not guarantee disaster. Many generals, superintendents, and CEOs have developed sufficient character to resist the temptations that come with their position of power, but enough incidents do occur to warrant a board’s concern.

Some examples

JH – As superintendent, JH had a habit of illegally charging the district for mileage recorded between home and office. He routinely submitted reimbursement vouchers for daily breakfast stops enroute to work and for regular visits to the coffee shop during the day. In addition, he often scheduled two days per week to “work from home” and took vacation time off without recording it as such, rationalizing that he was on duty 24/7 as superintendent, so was always working, even while on the beach at a vacation destination.

MS – A secondary teacher was accused of sexual harassment of a student, but the superintendent directed a hurried, surface–only internal investigation that “cleared” the teacher of the charge. Later, when word of the teacher’s ongoing behaviors reached the public, the board took belated action that could/should have been taken months earlier by the superintendent.

PB – When PB assumed duties as a member of the superintendent’s cabinet, the superintendent began his in– brief with the following warning: “I will fire you if you ever talk to a board member.” The message was clear and memorable, so much so that she worried about her job before answering even the simplest of board member questions. Board members subsequently were isolated from staff, and were unaware when various scandals blew up, scandals about which “everyone” (everyone, except for the board of directors) was already aware.

NC – The superintendent had a habit of avoiding confrontations with direct subordinates yet wanted to hold them accountable for their actions. She advertised an open-door policy to all staff members, then initiated formal investigations (without any preliminary inquiries to get the other side of the story, and without dealing with subordinate conduct directly) whenever teachers visited her office to complain about their principals, or district staff had a complaint about a cabinet member. This habit drove off key subordinates and directly resulted in high rates of turnover, because it encouraged complainers to go around the chain of command, undermining the authority of key members of the district leadership, and costing the district large sums of money for lengthy but inconclusive investigations, unnecessary buy– out of contracts, etc.

JB – When an administrator was recommended for nonrenewal (the particular position had been occupied by 3 administrators over the course of 3 years) the board failed to inquire into the reason for the decision. When, less than 8 months later, her replacement brought to the board complaints about the superintendent’s excessive and imprudent spending on central office staffing, to the detriment of strategic classroom– level teaching and learning priorities, the board relied on an investigator who was hired by (and reported to) the superintendent to provide data and analysis of the spending, then approved an expensive buy–out of the whistle–blower. It was no surprise to cabinet members that the external investigator cleared (with elaborate but unsupported rationalizations) those spending decisions. Then the board approved an expensive buy– out of the complainant’s contract.

Recognizing its duty to the community to assure district success while avoiding hazards that endanger the organization’s ability to achieve that success, a board of directors must do more than (ostensibly) carefully selecting its CEO and then turning their selectee loose, hoping that good things will follow.

What is a Board of Directors to Do?

I used to think that it was enough to hire the best-qualified candidate, tell the superintendent what outcomes the community desires and expects, then delegate sufficient authority to get the job done, clearly identifying parameters to guide the means by which such authority should be exercised and granting freedom to act in keeping with those expectations. Such an approach, along with a strategic plan, an approved budget, curriculum, etc. seemed to be what is required to meet our obligations in guiding and directing the district. In essence, once the board had set such guidance in place and various district operating structures were established, I (and many other board members of similar mind) tended to be complacent, expecting success to follow more or less automatically, as if we were heeding the sales pitch of entrepreneur Ron Popeil (the Ronco Rotisserie). Boards may hope it is enough to let the district run itself, but real-world experience suggests otherwise. “Set it and forget it” is a losing strategy.

I am now convinced the missing piece of the puzzle for many board– CEO relationships is a lack of supervision. For many others, the problem is supervision poorly done. School boards don’t have a good grasp on their role in supervising their only real subordinate, the superintendent. Indeed, they often don’t even recognize such a role is needed.

Next – Part II, The Board Role in Supervision